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The primary purpose of this Article is to provide citizen enforcers 
of environmental laws with an efficient tool for establishing standing 
in the face of Justice Antonin Scalia’s heightened standing doctrine.  
This Article also significantly contributes to the literature on ultra 
vires statutes in corporate law by tracing their historical origins in 
 2009] Ultra Vires Statutes 77 
greater detail, clarifying terminology, and summarizing recent case 
law that explicitly affirms the power of ultra vires statutes. 
Given the scope and severity of environmental problems1 and the 
limited resources of government to enforce environmental protection 
laws, citizen lawsuits can play an important role in assuring that 
relevant statutes and regulations are obeyed.  However, it has become 
increasingly difficult for citizens who are suing to enforce 
environmental legislation to establish standing.  Amorphous yet 
sometimes harshly applied standards require that a direct injury-in-
fact that is specific to the plaintiff, redressable, and within a 
statutorily implied zone of interest be demonstrated, which is not 
always easy for plaintiffs alleging environmental harms. 
Ultra vires statutes in corporate law may provide a solution in some 
contexts.  These statutes allow a shareholder of a company to sue to 
enjoin the company from acting in a manner outside of what is 
authorized by its corporate charter.  Since corporations are still 
required to commit to only lawful activities in their charters, an 
individual may sue to enjoin the unlawful activities of a corporation 
in which the individual owns shares. 
A popular misconception persists that ultra vires lawsuits are an 
obsolete phenomenon.  On the contrary, recent court opinions 
explicitly state that ultra vires statutes are still a legitimate basis for 
pursuing injunctions. 
Standing to sue corporate environmental malfeasors may therefore 
be established by purchasing shares in a corporation.  An ultra vires 
lawsuit then allows plaintiffs to pursue injunctions and equitable 
remedies, such as court monitoring of the defendants. 
While there are foreseeable objections to this theory, reference to 
legislative intent, the historical evolution of doctrines, respect for 
state statutes, precedent, public policy, concern for the protection of 
investors, and even constitutional law all militate in favor of a 
conclusion that ultra vires statutes may, and ought to, be used and 
recognized as a basis for establishing standing to enforce 
environmental statutes. 
However, as explained in Part I, since the early 1990s, this major 
component of federal environmental protection legislation—the right 
 
1 While it is not a key point of this Article, footnote 192 features a brief review of 
respected sources asserting that there are worldwide environmental crises.  See infra note 
192. 
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of citizens to sue to enforce the law—has been eroded.2  In his 
opinions on behalf of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia 
narrowed the range of violations amenable to citizen enforcement by 
applying amorphous standing tests more stringently.3  These newly 
enhanced standing tests—what could be fairly characterized as the 
Scalia standing gauntlet—contradict the letter, spirit, and historical 
intentions of the relevant legislation.4  These additional procedural 
hurdles also create inefficiencies for all those involved in the 
litigation.5  The outcome is clear; it is less certain that citizens and 
public interest groups will succeed in enforcing environmental laws 
 
2 The trend has been the topic of extensive scholarly analysis and comment.  See, e.g., 
Ellyn J. Bullock, Acid Rain Falls on the Just and the Unjust: Why Standing’s Criteria 
Should Not Be Incorporated into Intervention of Right, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 605 (1990); 
Stephen M. Johnson, Private Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environmental 
Citizen Suits, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 383 (2001); James R. May, Now More than Ever, 
Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2003); Charles N. 
Nauen, Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After Gwaltney: The Thrill of Victory or the 
Agony of Defeat?, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 327 (1989); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is 
Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999); Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret 
Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (1998); Kristi M. 
Smith, Who’s Suing Whom?: A Comparison of Government and Citizen Suit 
Environmental Enforcement Actions Brought Under EPA-Administered Statutes, 1995–
2000, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After 
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); John 
Dolgetta, Comment, Friends of the Earth v. Crown Central Petroleum: The Surrogate 
Enforcer Must Be Allowed to “Stand Up” for the Clean Water Act, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 707 (1998); Matt Handley, Comment, Why Crocodiles, Elephants, and American 
Citizens Should Prefer Foreign Courts: A Comparative Analysis of Standing to Sue, 21 
REV. LITIG. 97 (2002); Kristi G. Lewis, Case Notes, The United States Supreme Court 
Creates Dangerous Precedent, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 361 (2000); Elizabeth Rae Potts, 
Comment, A Proposal for an Alternative to the Private Enforcement of Environmental 
Regulations and Statutes Through Citizen Suits: Transferable Property Rights in Common 
Resources, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 547 (1999). 
3 One scholar has gone so far as to state that there are “no consistently applied rules” of 
standing, that “[t]he Supreme Court . . . has failed to develop or to apply any lasting 
standards,” and that they are often “‘formed’ on an ad hoc basis.” Edward B. Sears, Note, 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: Environmental Plaintiffs Are Tripped Up on 
Standing, 24 CONN. L. REV. 293, 294 (1991). 
4 One contemporary variation of the definition of the word gauntlet is intended here; 
namely, a test or rite of passage that involves overcoming some adversity and displeasure 
created by other people.  In the context of citizen enforcement suits of environmental laws, 
it is fair to identify the enhanced standing criteria with one justice, since Antonin Scalia 
clearly stated his plan for modifying standing criteria well ahead of being nominated to the 
Supreme Court.  Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 884 (1983).  As evidenced by the 
Supreme Court decisions described in Part I of this Article, Scalia subsequently managed 
to convince a majority of his colleagues to accept his vision in several landmark decisions. 
5 See infra Parts I.B, I.F. 
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when the government is unwilling or unable to do so.6  Finally, 
because the court opinions establishing the Scalia standing gauntlet 
leave sufficient room for interpretation, they have resulted in 
unpredictable and inconsistent outcomes among federal district and 
appellate courts and between various decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court itself.7 
It should be stressed at the outset that establishing standing in no 
way guarantees success on the merits.8  However, getting into court 
and preserving a favorable judgment on appeal necessitates solid 
proof of standing and therefore is a highly significant threshold to 
overcome. 
Ultra vires statutes9 in corporate law may provide a means of 
circumventing the problem of establishing standing, as explained in 
Part II.  Though assumed to be dead or dormant, there is actually no 
good reason to believe that the relevant legislation of forty-nine states 
 
6 Some litigants have managed to pass these tests to the satisfaction of the Supreme 
Court.  See infra Part I.E.2.  However, the opinions articulating the difficult and evolving 
gauntlet of tests have not been overturned.  These opinions provide the basis for variations 
among the circuit courts of appeal in terms of how high they set the hurdle for 
environmental litigants, depending on the sympathies of judges.  The only suggested silver 
lining of the enhanced and inconsistently applied standing tests for environmental 
plaintiffs is that they may be motivated to better articulate how environmental degradation 
is an urgent matter for humans.  Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA 
L. REV. 931, 932 (1998). 
7 See infra Part I.E. 
8 Since the 1990s, it has become especially difficult to foresee how environmental 
statutes will be interpreted and applied.  For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has gone so far as to interpret “shall” to mean “may.”  Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 
898, 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency’s failure to 
respond to violations of the Clean Water Act was within the zone of discretion of 
administrators and therefore was not subject to judicial review).  For a synopsis of this 
decision’s logic, highlighting the need for enforcers to prioritize, see Court Reports, 5 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 573, 588–89 (2002).  Justice Scalia’s opinions, to some observers, 
indicate that he believes that there is “no body of environmental law, warranting the 
Court’s acknowledgement or respect.”  Peter Manus, Wild Bill Douglas’s Last Stand: A 
Retrospective on the First Supreme Court Environmentalist, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 111, 112 
(1999). 
9 Scholars have previously used the term ultra vires doctrine.  In an historical context, 
this is not inappropriate inasmuch as the ultra vires doctrine existed before states passed 
ultra vires statutes.  However, such terminology is misleading in that attorneys, judges, and 
fellow scholars may be led to believe that contemporary ultra vires lawsuits are based 
solely on case law.  Discussions of contemporary ultra vires lawsuits should reference the 
relevant statutes.  Besides reducing the risk of confusion, it is appropriate to refer to ultra 
vires statutes—as opposed to the ultra vires doctrine—because recent cases have cited to 
statutes.  These statutes arguably carry more weight than case law, and future litigation 
will likely continue to cite the relevant state statutes rather than doctrine. 
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has been repealed or eliminated.10  Ultra vires statutes allow for the 
owner of a single share in a company to sue to enjoin that company 
from performing any acts outside of what is authorized by its 
corporate charter.  In their charters, corporations are required to 
commit to only lawful conduct and to promise to engage in only 
lawful activities.  Therefore, an individual may sue to enjoin the 
unlawful activities of a corporation in which he or she owns shares. 
As explained herein, plaintiffs may establish standing to sue 
corporate environmental malfeasors by purchasing shares in those 
companies.  Consequently, the conventional standing hurdles are 
irrelevant.  The court could then take action to stop the illegal 
activities.  Precedent cases indicate that the corporation could be 
made to pay fines for illegalities already perpetrated and that 
executives and directors could be made personally liable for the 
company’s actions.11  Equitable remedies, such as court monitoring of 
the corporation, could also be available.12  This Article suggests that 
public interest groups adopt this strategy of purchasing shares to 
circumvent the Scalia standing gauntlet. 
Finally, in Part III, this Article counters foreseeable objections to 
the thesis that ultra vires statutes can and should be used as tools in 
contemporary environmental litigation.  As mentioned, legislative 
intent, the historical evolution of doctrines, respect for state statutes, 
precedent, public policy, concern for the protection of investors, and 
constitutional law all militate in favor of the conclusion that ultra 
vires statutes can and ought to be available as a means for citizen 
plaintiffs to enforce environmental protection statutes. 
I 
STANDING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWSUITS 
A.  The Relatively New Concept of Standing Tests 
Standing is a relatively new concept in American jurisprudence.13  
Until the 1930s, courts simply checked to make sure there was a 
cognizable legal right at stake, whether based in provisions of 
 
10 See infra Part II. 
11 See infra Part III.A. 
12 See infra Part III.A. 
13 E.g., Alberto B. Lopez, Laidlaw and the Clean Water Act: Standing in the Bermuda 
Triangle of Injury in Fact, Environmental Harm, and “Mere” Permit Exceedances, 69 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 159, 162–63 (2000); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 170, 179. 
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constitutions, common law, or statutes.14  The growth in the number, 
size, and significance of administrative agencies in the United States 
led to lawsuits challenging the regulatory and enforcement decisions 
of these agencies.15  The conceptual origin of standing—the question 
of justiciability—was articulated chiefly by Justices Frankfurter and 
Brandeis to restrain the court system’s intrusion into the Roosevelt 
administration’s initiatives and the corresponding acts of Congress.16  
In 1946, Congress codified judge-made law regarding citizen-initiated 
judicial review of agency actions with the Administrative Procedures 
Act (APA), explicitly acknowledging that causes of action could be 
created by statute and common law.17  Into the 1970s, the Supreme 
Court stated that “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, 
the invasion of which creates standing.”18 
B.  The Intent, Text, and History of Citizen Suit Provisions in 
Environmental Law 
The origins of citizen suit provisions in environmental legislation 
date back to 1970 and the realization that governmental entities had 
been failing at the enforcement of environmental laws during the 
1960s.19  Practically every major piece of environmental legislation 
includes a citizen suit provision, allowing lawsuits against private 
parties and the relevant non-enforcing agency for declaratory and 
injunctive relief and the payment of civil damages.20  Given the 
 
14 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224 (1988).  For 
an excellent summary of case law indicating that the plain meaning of statutes was applied 
through the early 1900s, that the direct-injury rule did not achieve widespread use until the 
1950s, and that it did not decisively replace the ordinary meaning interpretation of statutes, 
see John F. Hart, Standing Doctrine in Antitrust Damage Suits, 1890–1975: Statutory 
Exegesis, Innovation, and the Influence of Doctrinal History, 59 TENN. L. REV. 191 
(1992). 
15 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 179–81. 
16 Id. 
17 Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 (2006)).  Despite the recent creation of standing tests and the passage of the APA, 
one scholar has argued that administrative review of agency decisions should be 
presumptively available and is to some extent a constitutionally protected right.  Louis L. 
Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review (pt. 1), 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 420 (1958). 
18 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). 
19 JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL 
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 3 (1987) (stating that existing means of enforcement were 
considered burdensome and awkward). 
20 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006); Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2006); Clean  
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failure on the part of the public sector to enforce environmental laws, 
Congress explicitly granted citizens the right to sue to enforce the law 
as a supplement to conventional law enforcement.21  Even critics of 
citizen suit provisions acknowledge that Congress believed citizen 
suits would be “an efficient policy instrument and . . . a participatory, 
democratic mechanism that allows ‘concerned citizens’ to redress 
environmental pollution.”22  The legislative intent behind the statutory 
provisions is unambiguous.  As one of the architects of the Clean 
Water Act said: 
[E]very citizen of the United States has a legitimate and established 
interest in the use and quality of the navigable waters of the United 
States.  Thus, I would presume that a citizen of the United States, 
regardless of residence, would have an interest as defined in this bill 
regardless of the location of the waterway and regardless of the 
issue involved.23 
Some in Congress believed that citizen suits could spur 
governmental enforcement or provide an alternative method to 
penalize violators.24  In some statutes, such as the Endangered Species 
Act, the statutory language does not qualify what kind of citizen may 
bring the enforcement suit, stating that “any person,” even without 
particularized injury, was intended to have the ability to function as a 
private attorney general.25  Based on these express motivations and 
the text of the legislation, it is clear that Congress intended such 
 
Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2006); Deepwater Port Act of 1974 § 16, 33 U.S.C. § 
1515 (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2006); Noise Control 
Act of 1972 § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 
7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 § 310, 
42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) 
(2006).  For example, the Clean Water Act authorizes “a person or persons having an 
interest which is or may be adversely affected” to compel future compliance by asking for 
prescriptive injunctive relief and, either in addition or alternatively, for the imposition of 
civil penalties payable to the United States Treasury.  33 U.S.C. § 1365(g). 
21 Lopez, supra note 13, at 160; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 183–84. 
22 Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 
339, 340 (1990). 
23 118 CONG. REC. § 33,717 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie). 
24 MILLER, supra note 19, at 4. 
25 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006). 
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statutes to mean what they say: the violation of these laws grants 
standing to anyone to sue to enforce these statutes.26 
C.  Reconciling Standing Requirements and Citizen Suit Provisions 
Meanwhile, as late as the 1960s, the Supreme Court had yet to 
develop contemporary standing analysis.27  In the case of Flast v. 
Cohen, the Court even allowed an individual to sue for judicial review 
of a decision regarding the use of taxes to subsidize a parochial 
school.28  The Court developed the prudential standing test to decide 
whether to allow lawsuits where Congress had not created a cause of 
action but where plaintiffs claimed to be the intended beneficiaries of 
an agency.29  The prudentiality test requires a showing that: (1) a 
plaintiff’s injury is particularized and not shared by many, (2) the 
legal interests are the plaintiff’s own and not someone else’s, and (3) 
the complaint is in the zone of interests served by a relevant statute or 
part of the Constitution.30  This new inquiry into whether there is an 
injury-in-fact arising from a regulatory decision was intended to 
expand and simplify access to the courts for plaintiffs who could not 
point to a clear injury-at-law.31  This test merged with another 
relatively novel standing test grounded in the Constitution.32  The 
constitutional test likewise emerged out of cases where Congress had 
not created a cause of action, but rather where a plaintiff sought to 
 
26 Lopez, supra note 13, at 160–61.  Even detractors of the concept acknowledge that 
Congress truly intended that any citizen should be empowered to enforce environmental 
statutes and that the majority of scholars advocate for courts to honor this intent.  Greve, 
supra note 22, at 340–41. 
27 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 180–82. 
28 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). 
29 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 180–81.  For example, this test was used in a case where a 
plaintiff was denied a broadcast license from the FCC.  Office of Commc’n of the United 
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000–06 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
30 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1970). 
31 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 184–86.  A similar characterization, but worded slightly 
differently, is that the Supreme Court developed the zone-of-interests test as a way to 
delineate the broad grant of standing under the APA.  See Kimberly C. Strasser, 
Environmental Law: The Scope of the Environmental Standing Act, 52 MD. L. REV. 673 
(1993). 
32 The first time that Article III was brought up in the context of an opinion allowing a 
lawsuit was in 1944.  See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944); Sunstein, supra note 2, 
at 169.  Though courts did previously require particularized harm in the context, for 
example, of an individual suing to correct a perceived injustice in a tax regime, the Court 
did not dwell on the concept of standing or engage in a prolonged, multi-pronged exercise 
in parsing.  See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487–88 (1923). 
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override an executive branch decision through a court decision.33  
Article III of the Constitution grants the judiciary the power to resolve 
“cases” and “controversies” on behalf of aggrieved parties.34  As 
articulated concisely in Allen v. Wright, the Supreme Court therefore 
decided that a plaintiff has standing to challenge a decision from the 
executive branch if the plaintiff can allege facts to show not only (1) 
an injury-in-fact but (2) a causal connection between the injury and 
complained of conduct and (3) that the injury can be redressed by a 
favorable decision.35 
With the advent of citizen suit provisions in environmental 
legislation, the courts began reconciling these standing 
requirements—articulated in the context of lawsuits where there was 
not a statutorily created cause of action—with the statutorily created 
rights of citizens to sue to override agency decisions and to enforce 
laws.36  Scholars tracing the Court’s approach to standing through the 
1970s and 1980s frequently cite to the following cases as landmarks.37 
In the Sierra Club v. Morton decision, the Court held that imminent 
negative impacts on “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being” could 
constitute injury-in-fact.38  The Court also allowed the Sierra Club—a 
third party that was not directly harmed—to sue on behalf of specific 
members, so long as they were identified.39  The Sierra Club opinion 
is therefore seen as a very favorable decision to environmental 
plaintiffs.  In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures, a very tenuous connection was alleged between a 
decision on transport tariffs for raw materials and harm to the 
plaintiffs as a result of reduced use of recyclable materials; yet, the 
Court accepted this case as satisfying all three prongs of both the 
Article III test and prudentiality test.40  This case illustrates how far 
 
33 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 194–95; see, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26 (1976) (involving citizens attempting to appeal decisions on taxation and 
spending); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (including an appeal of a 
decision not to prosecute someone for failure to make child support payments). 
34 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
35 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
36 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 195–96. 
37 See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 13, at 161; Laveta Casdorph, Comment, The Constitution 
and Reconstitution of the Standing Doctrine, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 471 (1999). 
38 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). 
39 Id. at 739. 
40 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 
688–90 (1973) (stating that the pleadings contained sufficient allegation to show standing). 
 2009] Ultra Vires Statutes 85 
the Court was willing to open the door for citizens to access the 
courts.  The Court’s holding in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Environmental Study Group, Inc. reaffirmed that aesthetic and 
environmental harm can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement and that 
the violation of an environmental statute is sufficient to meet the 
zone-of-interest requirement.41 
The opinions in the cases above present a clear inclination to 
interpret standing requirements broadly and to favor granting citizens 
access to the courts when suing to enforce environmental protection 
statutes, insisting only that “pleadings must be something more than 
an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.”42  The opinions 
appear consistent with the intent and text of legislation that created 
citizen rights of action.  Some justices even suggested abandoning the 
requirement that anthropocentric harms must be shown before hearing 
lawsuits to enforce environmental protection legislation.  Justice 
Douglas penned an opinion suggesting that trees, rivers, and even 
entire ecosystems have standing.43 
D.  The Scalia Standing Gauntlet 
1.  Scalia’s Approach 
In 1983, then-Judge Antonin Scalia wrote a law review article 
arguing in favor of stricter standing tests and deriding the “judiciary’s 
long love affair with environmental litigation.”44  This article, written 
while Justice Scalia was on the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals, presaged what Justice Blackmun called Scalia’s “slash-and-
burn expedition through the law of environmental standing.”45  
 
41 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73–74 (1978).  
The Court’s holding in Sierra Club did not go as far as the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 1966, which held that Article III and a citizen suit provision in the Federal 
Power Act allowed individuals to function as purely citizen attorneys general without any 
allegation of specified harm.  Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
42 Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 688. 
43 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 742–49 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (condoning such an 
approach in cases where a reputable organization like the Sierra Club professed to be 
litigating on behalf of the environment). 
44 Scalia, supra note 4, at 884–85. 
45 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan II), 504 U.S. 555, 606 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
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“What’s it to you?” was the question Scalia wanted courts to ask of 
all plaintiffs in citizen suits to enforce environmental law.46 
2.  Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation or Lujan I 
In Lujan I, the plaintiffs sought review of the Department of 
Interior decision to grant extractive industries access to public lands.47  
Scalia’s majority found that while the plaintiff citizens may have 
satisfied the zone-of-interests test, they did not claim any facts that 
suggested an actual harm to those interests.48  Some environmentalists 
apparently saw a silver lining to the decision, however, because the 
majority still held that aesthetic and environmental concerns are 
sufficient to claim an injury-in-fact and thus qualify as an aggrieved 
party under the APA and standing tests.49  The inadequacy in the 
plaintiffs’ pleadings, in the opinion of the majority, was that their 
aesthetic and environmental concerns lacked an adequate connection 
to specific decisions on specific parcels of land.50 
3.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife or Lujan II 
In Lujan II, the plaintiffs challenged a Reagan administration 
decision to reverse a Carter era regulation that required U.S. foreign 
aid projects to follow the Endangered Species Act’s requirement of 
formal interagency consultations when endangered species’ habitats 
are placed at risk.51  Scalia’s opinion again reiterated acceptance of 
aesthetic interests as valid but focused on the lack of any imminent, 
specific plans of the plaintiffs to travel to see the endangered species 
at issue.52  Scalia’s majority opinion in Lujan II refined the concept of 
injury-in-fact to require (1) a concrete and particularized injury that is 
(2) actual or imminent and (3) not hypothetical nor based on 
conjecture.  Some authors have defended this conclusion, saying it 
just clarified the requirement that there be a particularized and at least 
 
46 Scalia, supra note 4, at 882. 
47 Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n (Lujan I), 497 U.S. 871, 875–80 (1990). 
48 Id. at 883. 
49 Bill J. Hays, Comment, Standing and Environmental Law: Judicial Policy and the 
Impact of Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 997 (1991). 
50 Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 899. 
51 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan II), 504 U.S. 555, 557–59 (1992). 
52 Id. at 563–64. 
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imminent harm.53  Others focused on Scalia’s eagerness to limit the 
power of Congress to grant standing: “[m]ost significantly, . . . the 
Court rejected the premise that Congress could confer standing by 
enacting an expansive citizen suit provision which could regulate 
actions of the federal government overseas.  For Justice Scalia, such a 
Congressional action violates the separation of powers doctrine.”54  
While the entire majority only signed onto the section of the opinion 
finding a lack of particularized and imminent harm, Scalia’s assertion 
in a separate section of his opinion of the importance of Article II, 
Section 3 of the Constitution—giving enforcement powers solely to 
the executive branch—was a signal of what was yet to come.55 
4.  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment further developed the redressability criterion of the 
standing gauntlet.56  In this case, the citizen plaintiffs alleged 
violations of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act of 1986.57  Scalia’s opinion again focused on the powers of 
the judiciary, under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, to 
decide “cases” and “controversies.”58  Standing in this case turned 
largely on the issue of redressability.59  While the citizens argued that 
there were past and future threats to their “safety, health, recreational, 
economic, aesthetic, and environmental interests” created by a 
company failing to lawfully disclose its use of toxic chemicals, 
Scalia’s opinion explains that none of the requested remedies would 
redress the alleged harms.60  Since violations had ceased, any 
 
53 Marshall J. Breger, Comment, Defending Defenders: Remarks on Nichol and Pierce, 
42 DUKE L.J. 1202, 1202–03 (1993). 
54 Michael J. Wray, Still Standing? Citizen Suits, Justice Scalia’s New Theory of 
Standing and the Decision in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 8 S.C. 
ENVTL. L.J. 207, 216–17 (2000). 
55 Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 557–78; see Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of Powers 
Challenges “Take Care” of Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-in-Fact, 
Private “Enforcers,” and Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 93, 95–
96 (2001) (critiquing this application of Article II of the Constitution). 
56 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 105–09 (1998). 
57 Id. at 86. 
58 Id. at 102. 
59 Id. at 105–09. 
60 Id. 
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injunctive relief was considered useless as a means of redressing 
harm.61 
E.  Inconsistencies and Unpredictability: Plaintiffs May Sometimes 
Still Pass the Gauntlet. 
1.  Bennett v. Spear 
When the plaintiffs included ranchers challenging a U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service decision on the maintenance of minimum water 
levels to protect an endangered species, the standing tests were 
applied slightly differently.62  The Court concluded that the 
Endangered Species Act eliminates the zone-of-interests test, 
justifying this outcome as follows: 
 Our readiness to take the term “any person” at face value is 
greatly augmented by two interrelated considerations: that the 
overall subject matter of this legislation is the environment (a matter 
in which it is common to think all persons have an interest) and that 
the obvious purpose of the particular provision in question is to 
encourage enforcement by so-called “private attorneys general”        
. . . .63 
This language would appear to starkly contradict earlier edicts that 
generalized harms to the environment do not grant individuals 
standing.64  The majority opinion attempts to justify this approach by 
asserting that the zone-of-interests test is prudential rather than 
constitutional, and it can therefore be expanded or abrogated.65  The 
logic above however and the looser application of the prudential 
standing test that follows are starkly different from Scalia’s earlier 
strict approach to standing tests and, together with the next case, 
hardly provide clear guidance to lower courts. 
 
61 Id.  Scalia did not see how forcing a government agency to collect a fine would 
redress any possible harm the citizens may have perceived.  Not even the costs of 
investigation or litigation could be recovered because the relevant law only allows for 
recovery of litigation costs, and recovery of the costs of litigation could not logically be 
the basis for standing.  Id. at 107–08. 
62 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
63 Id. at 165. 
64 See supra Parts I.D.2–3. 
65 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162. 
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2.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOC), Inc. 
The Laidlaw decision demonstrated that plaintiffs seeking 
environmental protection may also sometimes still pass the standing 
gauntlet.66  It is important to stress, first and foremost, that the 
Laidlaw decision did not claim to overturn the strict series of tests that 
Scalia articulated in the cases above in Part I.D.  Laidlaw was a 
somewhat surprising landmark, however, as all the justices that had 
been in the majority in the cases above, with the exception of Scalia 
and Thomas, concluded that the plaintiffs could qualify as having 
standing despite a fact pattern that appeared to present similar 
problems to those in the Steel Co. decision.  Ginsburg’s opinion on 
behalf of the seven-justice majority explained their application of 
standing criteria. 
The majority decided that subjective fear of harm that arises from 
an illegality and that causes a plaintiff to cease or avoid specific 
activities in a specific geographic location qualifies as an injury-in-
fact.67  Ginsburg’s opinion clarifies that the specificity of the 
geographic location in Laidlaw is contrasted with the lack of 
geographic specificity in Lujan I.68  Also, the actual avoidance of a 
recreational activity in Laidlaw contrasted with the “some day” loss 
of a recreational opportunity—the possibility of not being able to 
view endangered animals—that constituted the potential harm in 
Lujan II.69  The majority opinion explicitly rebuts Scalia’s assertion 
that actual damage to the environment stemming from illegal amounts 
of pollution is a sine qua non to have standing; in other words, fear of 
harm amounts to harm.70 
The majority also decided that the controversy was redressable, 
even though the company had shut down and dismantled the relevant 
facility and pollution had ceased during the time that the case was 
under appeal.71  Without explicitly overturning Steel Co., the Court 
came to the opposite conclusion with regard to the question of 
whether civil damages are a form of redress in such a context and 
 
66 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181–85 
(2000). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 183–84. 
69 Id. at 184. 
70 Id. at 181. 
71 Id. at 179. 
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therefore whether the plaintiffs had standing.72  The difference in the 
procedural histories amounted to this: the Laidlaw plaintiffs alleged 
harms at the time of the filing of their suit and alleged that the 
illegalities might begin again.73  In contrast, the Steel Co. plaintiffs 
did not allege that the illegalities might resume.74  Consistent with the 
tradition of anthropocentrism, the majority confirmed that the test to 
establish standing is whether there has been injury to human 
plaintiffs, which is separable and distinct from their surrounding 
environment.75 
Some have faulted the logic of Laidlaw.76  One critique is that if 
subjective fear of unproven facts can qualify as a type of harm, then 
potentially the harm can be utterly fictional.77  This critique prompted 
at least one observer to speculate that an avalanche of lawsuits will 
commence, with trial lawyers being the most significant 
beneficiaries.78  The author making this allegation failed to provide 
data that would support this alarmist rhetoric.79  Having to cover 
one’s own costs in the event of losing such a lawsuit and the lack of 
damage awards deter frivolous lawsuits of this variety.80 
Though it did not eliminate the Scalia gauntlet, should the Laidlaw 
decision be seen as somehow abrogating a strict standard of standing 
scrutiny?  Some have argued that this is the case, calling Laidlaw a 
 
72 The nature of the pollution may have influenced the Court’s standing analysis.  The 
Court noted that it was “of particular relevance to this case [that] mercury, an extremely 
toxic pollutant,” was repeatedly discharged along with other hazardous pollutants.  Id. at 
176.  Perhaps the fact that property values may have been affected also played a role in 
militating in favor of the citizen plaintiffs.  The opinion takes note of the belief of a 
landowner that the price of her lot may have been to some extent influenced by the 
discharges.  Id. at 182–83. 
73 Id. at 187–88. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 181 (stating that having to prove an injury to the environment would be too 
high a hurdle). 
76 See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Critiquing Laidlaw: Congressional Power to Confer 
Standing and the Irrelevance of Mootness Doctrine to Civil Penalties, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 287 (2001). 
77 See Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. at 198–201 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
78 Kimberly M. Large, Comment, The Mischaracterization of Justice Scalia as 
Environmental Foe: What Harm to Standing Following the Court’s Stance in Laidlaw 
Environmental v. Friends of the Earth? 10 WIDENER L. REV. 561, 576–77 (2004). 
79 See id. 
80 Note, Awards of Attorneys’ Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 677, 685–86 (1983). 
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counterrevolution that loosened standing criteria.81  The Court appears 
to have thought that it was providing helpful clarifications rather than 
a major revision.82  Regardless, one of the counterproductive 
outcomes of this opinion and the preceding sequence of opinions 
involving standing is the lack of certainty that comes with novel 
exercises in splitting hairs.83  Circuit courts are still free to interpret 
and apply the series of standing tests with just as much vim and 
vigor—or laxity—as they desire, resulting in inconsistencies and 
ambiguity.84 
A review of circuit court of appeals cases citing to Laidlaw 
supports the general observations averred to above and in the next 
section: the landmark cases defining tests to decide if environmental 
plaintiffs have standing do not provide clear and consistent standards, 
but rather have yielded an inefficient gauntlet of unpredictable 
severity.85 
F.  Commentary on the Scalia Standing Gauntlet 
An immediate problem with the ambiguous and inconsistently 
applied standing rules is the irregularity it has bred among federal 
district and appellate courts in deciding this issue.86  It has also been 
noted that the uncertainty of how standing tests will be applied and 
quibbling over whether a plaintiff has been harmed the right way has 
created inefficiencies.87  Further, the will of Congress at the time of 
 
81 Echeverria, supra note 76, at 294–96. 
82 See Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. at 186–87. 
83 See Echeverria, supra note 76, at 287. 
84 See Amanda J. Masucci, Comment, Stand By Me: The Fourth Circuit Raises 
Standing Requirements in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 12 
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 171–72 (2001). 
85 Zachary D. Sakas, Footnotes, Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit 
Split Regarding Standing in Procedural Injury-Based Programmatic Challenges, 13 U. 
BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 175, 192–207 (2006).  Thirty-two of thirty-seven opinions citing to 
Laidlaw as of May 7, 2009, distinguished their cases from the fact pattern in Laidlaw.  Of 
the remaining cases, two recognized disagreement with its holding, one called it into 
question, and another two declined to extend its holding.  The Laidlaw opinion itself 
acknowledged the problematic differences among circuits in their application of the 
Court’s standing tests.  See Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. at 179–80. 
86 See May, supra note 2, at 10–11; Sakas, supra note 85, at 207. 
87 Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate 
Constitutional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1139–40 (1994). 
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the passage of environmental statutes has effectively been blocked.88  
Setting aside inconsistencies in the application of recently created 
standing criteria, even by their authors on the Supreme Court, Scalia’s 
typical combative approach against law enforcement by citizens can 
be somewhat understood as motivated by the pursuit of limits on a 
perceived counter-democratic role of the judiciary.89  This ignores the 
obvious fact that it requires bold acts of judicial activism to severely 
abrogate the citizen suit provisions of multiple pieces of major 
legislation passed by Congress, the most representative branch of 
government.90  This is hardly a democratic approach.  Scalia’s 
opinion that the executive branch should lead a revival of 
constitutional separation of powers seems even more inconsistent 
with his professed desire to protect democracy.91 
 
88 One commentary has attempted to argue that Scalia is not an opponent to the cause 
of environmental protection.  The author makes many statements that lack supporting 
argumentation or citations to facts or decisions, for example: “Giving citizen-suit plaintiffs 
unfettered access to the courts has done little to further encourage environmental 
progress.”  Large, supra note 78, at 583. 
89 Scalia, supra note 4, at 894. 
90 For a compilation of articles illustrating the shock and outrage of the 
environmentalist community in the wake of Lujan II, see Donald Strong Higley, II, A 
Slash-and-Burn Expedition Through the Law of Environmental Standing—Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 15 CAMPBELL L. REV. 347, 364 n.122–23 (1993). 
91 Scalia’s purported motivations in protecting democracy seem all the more dubious 
when considered in the context of his role in granting certiorari and deciding the case of 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), arguably the most anti-democratic decision of the 
Supreme Court in U.S. history.  There is no shortage of critiques of the decision in Bush v. 
Gore.  E.g., Steven J. Mulroy, Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v. 
Gore into a Vehicle for Reform? 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 357, 364 n.47 (2002) 
(citing ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED 
ELECTION 2000 (2001) and Jonathan Schell, Vesuvius, NATION, Dec. 18, 2001).  Even 
supporters of the outcome have authored critiques of the decision.  See RICHARD A. 
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
COURTS (2001).  For one of the most comprehensive and excoriating denunciations, see 
Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn’t Count: The 2000 Election and the Failure of 
the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2001).  Scheppele begins her article with a 
vignette from the film Monty Python and the Holy Grail that she suggests is analogous to 
the quandary experienced by Gore in his litigation over the disputed 2000 election.  Id. at 
1361–65.  The vignette parodies the classic fairytale motif of a hero having to pass a test in 
order to proceed with a quest; however, the administrators of the test in the parodied 
version (the Knights Who Say Ni) change the rules of the test (bringing a shrubbery) 
without advance notice to the hero (King Arthur).  Id.  The quandary in this film reference 
is also analogous to the situation experienced by citizen plaintiffs in environmental 
lawsuits inasmuch as standing rules, as described above, have been changed without 
advance notice during the appeals process. 
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Scalia’s restrictive approach to standing could be somewhat 
comprehensible if there was a flood of frivolous citizen enforcement 
of environmental laws.  However, pre-Lujan citizen enforcement 
actions were not frivolous in nature.92  Statutes such as the Clean 
Water Act allow violators the benefit of a sixty-day period to come 
into compliance with the law after the finding of a violation and 
therefore avoid penalties.93  As mentioned above, plaintiffs having to 
cover their own costs in the event of losing and the lack of damage 
awards both serve as deterrents to frivolous lawsuits in the arena of 
citizen enforcement litigation.  Ultimately, EPA administrators, a 
Senate report, and scholars have all concluded that citizen lawsuits 
based on environmental statutes were remarkably successful at 
promoting regulatory compliance.94 
Finally, these standing games in the environmental context are 
farcical from a global perspective.  No one can separate themselves 
from a web of living systems that provide water, air, and food.  It 
follows that everyone could be defined as a potential plaintiff when 
environmental protection standards are violated.  Members of 
Congress expressed this perspective when passing key environmental 
legislation.95  This legislative intent was initially recognized and 
honored by the courts.96  While this may now seem like a radical 
approach, everyone—possibly even animals, trees, mountains, and the 
environment as a whole—should be granted standing.  The only 
questions left, as it would have been until the 1970s, are whether an 
illegality has been committed and whether Congress has created a 
cause of action.97  Regardless, the Scalia standing gauntlet, for better 
 
92 Steven D. Shermer, The Efficiency of Private Participation in Regulating and 
Enforcing the Federal Pollution Control Laws: A Model for Citizen Involvement, 14 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 461, 482–83 (1999); Stephen Fotis, Comment, Private Enforcement of 
the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 154–55 (1985). 
93 Fotis, supra note 92, at 147–48. 
94 Steven M. Dunne, Attorney’s Fees for Citizen Enforcement of Environmental 
Statutes: The Obstacles for Public Interest Law Firms, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 n.7 
(1990). 
95 118 CONG. REC. 33,717 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
96 Metro. Wash. Coal. for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639 F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (“The purpose of the citizen-suit provision [of the Clean Air Act] was to aid 
enforcement of the Act while ‘motivat[ing] governmental agencies charged with the 
responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings.’” (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-
1196, at 36 (1970))). 
97 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 181–82.  For a more current discussion of the challenges of 
applying present standing rules to lawsuits concerning global climate change, see Bradford  
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or for worse, currently exists as an unpredictable hurdle for 
environmental plaintiffs and defendants.  The remainder of this 
Article will describe a more efficient means for environmental 
plaintiffs to establish standing. 
II 
ULTRA VIRES STATUTES 
A.  History of the Ultra Vires Cause of Action 
The concept of a corporation—a group of people authorized by a 
sovereign to engage in a collective activity—originated in the ancient 
Roman Empire98 and functioned through European history,99 
American colonial times,100 and into our present era.101  The first 
corporations chartered specifically to engage in trade were formed in 
the 1500s in England and the Netherlands.102  Throughout most of this 
history, it was self evident that corporations had none of the natural 
rights that humans would eventually claim but that all of their abilities 
to act were granted and delineated by government through a charter; 
the document without which a corporate entity could not exist.103 
 
C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None? 35 ENVTL. L. 1 
(2005). 
98 In Roman times, the corporate form was used for towns, guilds, and colonies.  
COLOSSUS 6 (Jack Beatty ed., 2001). 
99 In the Middle Ages, the corporate form was used for universities, religious orders, 
and other so-called benevolent organizations providing civil services.  Id. 
100 Massachusetts and Virginia both began as trading corporations chartered by 
England.  Id. at 18–19. 
101 Corporations have come to be seen as the predominant institution of the present era.  
See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION (Constable 2005) (2004).  Widely cited statistics 
indicate that out of the largest one-hundred economies on the planet, a majority were 
corporations as of the early 2000s rather than countries; seventy percent of the U.S. 
economy was run by the Fortune 1000 companies and two-hundred corporations 
conducted almost one-third of the planet’s economic activity, yet employed less than one-
quarter of one percent of the world’s workforce.  THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL 
PROTECTION 37 (2002). 
102 According to one source, the first recorded business charters of incorporation were 
granted by Queen Elizabeth to the Muscovy Company in 1555, the Spanish Company in 
1577, and the East India Company in 1601.  COLOSSUS, supra note 98, at 6.  According to 
another, the trading companies of the Netherlands in the 1500s were among the first 
business associations.  HARTMANN, supra note 101, at 30.  The East India Company 
founded the first colony in Jamestown by deeding property to the Virginia Company in 
1606.  Id. at 49. 
103 HARTMANN, supra note 101, at 30. 
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The ultra vires doctrine in the corporate setting originated as an 
English common law tradition allowing shareholders or parties 
dealing with corporations to sue to enjoin or invalidate corporate acts 
that were outside of the activities specifically authorized in a 
corporate charter.104  The ultra vires doctrine is rooted in the more 
ancient doctrine of quo warranto, through which the authority of an 
entity or individual to act may be challenged.105 
The seminal ultra vires case against business corporations in 
England was decided by the House of Lords in 1875.  In Ashbury 
Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, the House of Lords held that a 
company’s legal power to do business depended upon the objects 
clause in its memorandum of association.106  The primary justification 
for the doctrine was the dual protection of investment interests of the 
 
104 Colman v. E. Counties Ry. Co., (1846) 50 Eng. Rep. 481, 487 (M.R.) (Ch.) (ruling 
that the charter of a railroad company could not confer the power to directors to invest in a 
steam boat company, even though this would have likely benefited the railroad company). 
105 In response, a defendant may then produce evidence of having received authority 
from the sovereign; recorded inquiries into the legitimacy of someone’s public office date 
back at least to 1274 and culminated in the Quo Warranto statute of 1290.  See Helen Cam, 
Quo Warranto Proceedings in the Reign of King Edward I, 1278–1294, 77 HARV. L. REV. 
985, 985–86 (1964).  The quo warranto action brought in 1682 by Charles II in which he 
challenged the legitimacy of the corporate charter of the city of London has been called the 
“most important case in English history.”  JENNIFER LEVIN, THE CHARTER CONTROVERSY 
IN THE CITY OF LONDON 1660–1688, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 80 (1969).  Since then, quo 
warranto actions—literally asking “by what warrant?”—have remained, for the most part, 
a means of challenging an individual’s claim to public office but have been at times used 
to revoke corporate charters.  See Logan Scott Stafford, Judicial Coup d’Etat: Mandamus, 
Quo Warranto and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 20 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 891 (1998); Comment, The Use of the Quo Warranto, 18 YALE 
L.J. 58, 58 (1908) [hereinafter Comment, The Use of the Quo Warranto]; Valeria 
Hendricks, Which Writ Is Which? A Trial Attorney’s Guide to Florida’s Extraordinary 
Writs, FLA. B.J., Apr. 2007, at 46.  To add to the potential confusion, some have asserted 
that a writ of mandamus was a proper vehicle for compelling a corporation to live up to its 
charter.  EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 
57–61, 181–83 (1954).  One authority attempted to clarify the issue by stating that a 
corporation’s legitimacy could be challenged with a quo warranto action in the absence of 
statutes.  Comment, Quo Warranto and Private Corporations, 37 YALE L.J. 237, 239–40 
(1927).  A writ of scire facias was used in England and during the 1800s in the United 
States to forfeit the franchise of a corporation for abuse, but this was rare and is deemed to 
have been an incorrect method.  Id. at 239 n.17.  For more on the history of quo warranto, 
see GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS, 64–65, 
112–15 (1960) and FORREST G. FERRIS & FORREST G. FERRIS, JR., THE LAW OF 
EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES: HABEAS CORPUS, QUO WARRANTO, CERTIORARI, 
MANDAMUS, AND PROHIBITION 160–76 (1926). 
106 Ashbury Ry. Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 653, 693. 
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company’s shareholders and security interests of its creditors.107  
Protection of the investment interests of shareholders from 
misappropriation was an especially important motivation in an era 
before mandatory disclosures; investors could evaluate the risk of a 
company based largely on its charter and sue to make sure their assets 
were used in a manner consistent with what had been promised.108 
A brief overview of the role of corporations in colonial America 
helps one to appreciate the impetus behind U.S. corporate law as 
conceptualized and practiced for the majority of its existence.  The 
story of corporations in colonial America has two sides: On the one 
hand, Massachusetts and Virginia were born as corporations.  On the 
other, revolutionaries came to dislike trading corporations for their 
exploitive nature.109  In the embryonic colonies of Massachusetts and 
Virginia, shareholder meetings were arguably incubators for 
representative government,110 with members voting their shares, 
choosing officers, and deciding policy.111  However, in subsequent 
years, the colonialists’ experience with corporations, such as the East 
India Company, schooled subsequent generations of political leaders 
in the new republic to be suspicious of concentrated economic 
 
107 Stephen J. Leacock, The Rise and Fall of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Commonwealth Caribbean Corporate Common Law, 5 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 67, 77 (2006). 
108 Jonathan Fielding, Enforcing International Labor Standards Through the Use of the 
Alien Tort Claims Act and Traditional Corporate Law, 17 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 77, 92–93 
(2004). 
109 The charters creating the East India Company, the Hudson Bay Company, and some 
of the American colonies were based on the model of the English kings’ grants of 
authority to municipalities.  8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
192–222 (1925). 
110 King James complained that “the Virginia Company was a seminary for a seditious 
Parliament.”  EDWARD D. NEILL, HISTORY OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON WITH 
LETTERS TO AND FROM THE FIRST COLONY NEVER BEFORE PRINTED 185 n.1 (1869). 
111 COLOSSUS, supra note 98, at 18–19.  In the context of this Article, it is ironic to note 
that the transformation of Massachusetts from trading company into commonwealth on 
October 19, 1630, was arguably the first ultra vires act by a corporation in the English 
colonies of the Americas—it was not authorized by the grant of authority from the 
sovereign to the trading company.  Id. at 19.  The two earliest English colonies were also 
witness to other firsts in the history of the legal framework of business in America; 
Jamestown colony allowed the formation of what was arguably the first trade union in the 
Americas, the first strike, and the first access to voting privileges as a result of that work 
stoppage by a group of Polish glassmakers.  J.C. HARRINGTON, GLASSMAKING AT 
JAMESTOWN: AMERICA’S FIRST INDUSTRY 3 (1952); THE POLES IN AMERICA 1608–1972, 
at 41–42 (Frank Renkiewicz ed., 1973). 
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power.112  The first battles of the American Revolution stemmed from 
colonists’ refusal to obey laws for which the East India Company had 
lobbied in its zeal to eliminate competition.113  The Tea Act, 
exempting the East India Company from having to pay taxes to 
Britain and providing a tax refund to the company to compensate for 
losses due to unsold inventory, was detrimental to small colonial 
merchants.114  It was seen as an abuse of corporate lobbying power 
that enriched shareholders at the expense of colonialists.115  Thus, the 
corporate form arguably played a role in shaping the form of the 
nascent governments of the United States, providing the cause for 
rebellion, and breeding mistrust of concentrated economic power. 
It is therefore not surprising that state laws of incorporation 
through the 1800s required corporations to apply for charters from 
state legislatures, to renew these charters periodically, and to specify 
in these charters the corporation’s authorized range of activities and 
the length of its legal existence.116  Specific language was included to 
allow state attorneys general and shareholders to sue either to dissolve 
the corporation for violating these terms or to enjoin the corporation 
from engaging in activities outside of those specifically authorized by 
its charter.117 
During the 1800s, it was uncontroversial that a shareholder could 
sue to have an activity of a corporation enjoined if it was not 
explicitly authorized in the corporation’s charter; for the same reason, 
 
112 Thomas Jefferson was famously suspicious of the corporate form, fretting about the 
rise of “moneyed corporations” as a threat to American democracy after leaving the 
presidency in 1816.  HARTMANN, supra note 101, at 30.  Suspicions that concentrated 
economic power in the corporate form ruins the functioning of markets and leads to 
corruption were shared by none other than Adam Smith and David Hume.  COLOSSUS, 
supra note 98, at 54.  Edmund Burke exposed corruption leading to the trial of Warren 
Hastings of the East India Company.  Id.  In short, Elizabethan trading companies 
illustrated not only the economic but the moral evils of monopoly.  Corporations came to 
be seen by these leading British thinkers as medieval holdovers—antique, inefficient, and 
corrupt.  Id.  Thomas Hobbes vividly analogized corporations to “wormes in the entrayles 
of a naturall man.”  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 256–57 (Oxford ed. 1909) (1651). 
113 HARTMANN, supra note 101, 51–63. 
114 Id. at 51–52. 
115 Id. at 52. 
116 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 
GEO. L.J. 1593, 1686 (1988). 
117 Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives!  A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1319 (2001). 
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an act of a corporation could be declared void.118  A milestone 
Supreme Court opinion captures the zeitgeist of the era with regard to 
this issue. 
A contract of a corporation, which is ultra vires, in the proper sense, 
that is to say, outside the object of its creation as defined in the law 
of its organization, and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon 
it by the legislature, is not voidable only, but wholly void, and of no 
legal effect.  The objection to the contract is not merely that the 
corporation ought not to have made it, but that it could not make it.  
The contract cannot be ratified by either party, because it could not 
have been authorized by either.  No performance on either side can 
give the unlawful contract any validity, or be the foundation of any 
right of action upon it.119 
Lawsuits based on ultra vires statutes continued to be used into the 
1900s to restrain corporate activities.120  Beyond just granting 
injunctions, courts agreed to dissolve corporations for illegalities into 
the 1890s.121  From the late 1800s and early 1900s, restrictions on 
corporations were gradually loosened by judicial decisions and 
changes to incorporation statutes.122 
 
118 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of ultra vires by stating that “the 
powers of corporations organized under legislative statutes are such and such only as those 
statutes confer.”  Thomas v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 71, 82 (1879).  The Court held that a lease 
agreement was ultra vires because it was “not within the scope of the powers conferred on 
the corporation.”  Id. at 83.  Another court stated simply: “As artificial creations they have 
no powers or faculties, except those with which they were endowed when created.” Leslie 
v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365–67 (N.Y. 1888). 
119 Cent. Transp. Co. v. Pullman’s Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 59 (1891). 
120 A comment in the Yale Law Journal from 1908 illustrates how widely and staunchly 
held was the belief that corporations and their agents continued to be constrained by their 
corporate charters: “In T. & T. T. Road Co. v. Campbell, the court said: ‘It is a sovereign 
prerogative, and vests in an individual only by virtue of a legislative grant!’ So general is 
this conception of a franchise that it is needless to multiply citations.”  Comment, The Use 
of the Quo Warranto, supra note 105, at 59 (citation omitted). 
121 New York’s highest court revoked the charter of a company for allowing 
management to enter under the control of the competition-stifling Sugar Trust.  People v. 
N. River Sugar Refining Co., 24 N.E. 834, 841 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1890).  The court referred 
to this action as “corporate death.”  Id. at 834.  New York, Ohio, Michigan, and Nebraska 
revoked the charters of oil, match, sugar, and whiskey trusts in the 1800s.  Russell 
Mokhiber, The Death Penalty for Corporations Comes of Age, BUS. ETHICS, Nov. 1, 1998, 
available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=1810. 
122 The most famous single judicial decision of this era expanding the rights of 
corporations was Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 
(1886), which includes a headnote suggesting that the Court accepted that corporations are 
persons for the purpose of the 14th Amendment during oral arguments.  Thom Hartmann 
presents evidence that the choice of the word “person” in the 14th Amendment and the 
wording of the comment in the headnote applying the 14th Amendment to corporations  
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The most important explanation why ultra vires lawsuits fell out of 
favor was their abuse by corporations seeking to avoid contractual 
obligations.123  Through the 1800s and into the beginning of the 
1900s, courts had accepted that if a corporation was not authorized to 
engage in an activity by its charter, then any contract related to that 
activity must be void or voidable.124  The ultra vires doctrine was at 
one point so sacrosanct that contractual obligations could be escaped 
even when contracts had been partially performed to the disadvantage 
of a creditor or supplier and the enrichment of the company.125  As a 
result, state incorporation laws were specifically altered to eliminate 
the ability of third parties to bring ultra vires lawsuits to invalidate 
contracts and hence avoid obligations.126  Criticisms of the ultra vires 
 
was part of a larger—and somewhat plainly visible—plan by corporate lawyers and 
lobbyists to assume greater power and privileges for their clients.  HARTMANN, supra note 
101, at 95–119.  Douglas Litowitz builds upon this discussion in his article Are 
Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.  811, 822 (2004).  The court reporter who wrote 
the headnote into the official record of the Santa Clara decision was an adept lawyer who 
had ties to the railroad industry.  Id. at 823.  Since only the text of judicial opinions is 
binding precedent, this case should not have been cited since then as the bedrock case 
supporting corporate personhood.  Nonetheless, as Litowitz points out, the Supreme Court 
and lower courts have since recognized corporate personhood, so independent of the Santa 
Clara decision, corporate personhood has a foundation in precedent.  Id. at 823.  The 
status of corporations as persons under the law allowed them to challenge state laws and 
fees as unconstitutional denials of property and freedom.  For a brief cataloging of 
freedoms in the Bill of Rights that were applied to corporations, see Katie J. Thoennes, 
Frankenstein Incorporated: The Rise of Corporate Power and Personhood in the United 
States, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 203, 210–11 (2005). 
123 Greenfield, supra note 117, at 1310. 
124 Charles E. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded? 33 YALE 
L.J. 49, 50–52 (1923).  By the early 1900s, a scholarly debate and disagreement between 
courts emerged over the question of whether unauthorized contracts were void or voidable; 
the answer to that question does not effect the viability of using the ultra vires doctrine to 
enjoin a company from ongoing illegalities.  Id. 
125 See, e.g., Middlesex Turnpike Corp. v. Locke, 8 Mass. 268, 271–72 (1811).  In 
Middlesex Turnpike Corp., the defendant subscriber to stock avoided paying money that 
he owed for shares because the legislature only subsequently permitted a rerouting of the 
turnpike by charter amendment.  Id.  The court ruled that the rerouting was ultra vires at 
the time and hence the obligation to pay money was void.  Id. 
126 For example, the change to Vermont’s relevant statute in 1915 contains language to 
assure that it can only be read as a broad grant of authority to engage in any act—so long 
as the act is legal.  “A corporation shall have authority to do any act which is necessary or 
proper to accomplish its purposes, and which is not repugnant to the law.  Without limiting 
or enlarging the effect of this general grant of authority, it is hereby specifically provided 
that it may have a corporate seal.” Vt. Laws 1915, No. 141, § 15. 
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doctrine have focused on this historical abuse of the doctrine as a 
defense in the context of contractual enforcement.127 
At the same time that statutes were reformed to eliminate abuse, 
ultra vires lawsuits became less important as a means to protect 
shareholder interests because of the concept of shareholder primacy 
and the business judgment rule.128  During the 1800s and early 1900s, 
judicial opinions reflected a shift from regarding a corporation 
primarily as an artificial public creation of the government to the 
notion that a corporation exists as a naturally arising nexus of 
contracts to serve private shareholders’ financial interest as their 
primary, some would say sole, purpose of existence.129 
Once the concept of shareholder primacy became part of the 
enforceable duties of managers, the function of ultra vires suits to 
restrain management discretion and protect shareholders’ financial 
interests became significantly less important.130  Managers now had a 
clear fiduciary duty to shareholders, with their discretion, choices, and 
behavior guided by the business judgment rule.131 
Finally, shareholder derivate suits became a substitute to ultra vires 
suits as a means for shareholders to enforce the obligations of 
managers.132  With all of these changes in place, corporations had 
vastly expanded their freedoms, allowing them to exploit 
opportunities to serve their shareholders.133  At the same time, as a 
result of the foregoing factors, ultra vires lawsuits became 
increasingly rare. 
 
127 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 124, at 49; Michael Schaeftler, Ultra Vires–Ultra 
Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires Acts of Business Corporations, 9 J. 
CORP. L. 81 (1983). 
128 Greenfield, supra note 117, at 1313. 
129 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 212 (1990).  Since 
corporations came to be imagined as natural entities owing their existence to private acts 
of individuals, the shareholders could now ratify acts, which weakened the ultra vires 
concept.  Id.  The change in conceptualization of the corporation from an artificial and 
public creation of the state to that of an essentially natural nexus of contracts among 
private individuals dates back to the 1820s.  COLOSSUS, supra note 98, at 45.  The 
reconceptualization of the corporate form from public entity to natural nexus of contracts 
did not, however, erode the corporation’s claim to personhood under the law.  Id. at 157–
58. 
130 Greenfield, supra note 117, at 1313. 
131 Id. 
132 Leacock, supra note 107, at 56–59. 
133 Id. 
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From another perspective, not inconsistent with the others, the 
decline of the ultra vires doctrine was symptomatic of a race to the 
bottom, in terms of restrictions on corporate freedom, as states sought 
to create the friendliest and most inviting climates for corporations.134 
B.  Ultra Vires Statutes and Corporate Charters 
The only promise that all large publicly traded corporations must, 
and do, make in their articles of incorporation and charters is to not 
break laws.135  The laws of forty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia require corporations to limit themselves to lawful 
activities.136  Delaware is among these forty-seven states; the first 
 
134 COLOSSUS, supra note 98, at 134–35.  The fear that “millions in capital were fleeing 
the state” precipitated the elimination of restraints in Massachusetts corporate charters.  Id. 
at 46.  Delaware only became the incorporation state of choice after Woodrow Wilson, 
then governor of New Jersey, grew so alarmed at the conduct of corporations that he 
slowed the further erosion of controls on corporations.  Id. at 134. 
135 This requirement remains, even as all other restrictions to corporate longevity or 
activities have been removed from the incorporation laws of every state.  JAMES D. COX 
ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 3.6, at 50–51 (1997). 
136 See ALA. CODE § 10-2B-3.01 (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.005 (2008); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-301 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-103(a) (West 2004); CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 206 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-103-101 (2006); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 33-645 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2001); D.C. CODE § 
29-301.04 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0301 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-301 
(2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-41(a) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-301(1) (2005); 
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.05 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-1(a) (West 
2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.1 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6001(b) (2007); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.3-010 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:22 (1994); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-B, § 201(1) (2005 & Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. 
& ASS’NS § 2-101 (West 2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156, § 6 (LexisNexis 2005); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1251 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-3.01 (West 1999); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.386(1) (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-114(1) (2007); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2024 (LexisNexis 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.030 
(LexisNexis 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:3.01 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-
1 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-3 (West 2003); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 201 
(McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-01 (West 2003); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-08 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.03 (West 1994); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1005 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.074 (2008); 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 1301 (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-3 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-
3-101 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-2-3 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-13-101 
(West 2002); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-
301 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-626 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
23B.03.010 (West 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0301 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
17-16-301 (2007).  The only two states that do not have such language are Minnesota and 
Vermont.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.101 (West 2004) (“A corporation may be 
incorporated under this chapter for any business purpose or purposes . . . .”).  Vermont  
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section of the Delaware statute establishes that “[a] corporation may 
be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote 
any lawful business or purposes.”137  The laws of forty-nine states 
allow shareholders and state attorneys general to sue to enjoin illegal 
activities or to dissolve corporations in these instances.138  
Interestingly, while most state laws provide that state attorneys 
general may revoke corporate charters, Delaware law states that the 
Delaware Attorney General shall revoke a corporate charter for illegal 
acts.139  The Model Business Corporation Act retains language 
allowing for an ultra vires cause of action.140  While corporations may 
have been set free of narrow constraints on their power, the language 
that allows for ultra vires lawsuits has not been scrubbed from state 
statutes.141 
The other text plainly committing corporations to only lawful 
activities can be found in the corporate articles of incorporation and 
charters themselves.  Unocal’s articles of incorporation state that the 
“purpose of the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity 
 
does not have such statutory language.  It has specific purposes listed, but the general 
purposes section was repealed in 1971.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 41 (repealed 1971). 
137 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b). 
138 Only North Dakota does not provide its attorney general with the power to revoke 
charters.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-08; Schaeftler, supra note 127, at 85 n.9. 
139 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 284. 
140 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.04 (1969). 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the validity of corporate action may not 
be challenged on the ground that the corporation lacks or lacked power to act. 
(b) A corporation’s power to act may be challenged: 
(1) in a proceeding by a shareholder against the corporation to enjoin the act; 
(2) in a proceeding by the corporation, directly, derivatively, or through a 
receiver, trustee, or other legal representative, against an incumbent or former 
director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation; or 
(3) in a proceeding by the attorney general under section 14.30. 
(c) In a shareholder’s proceeding under subsection (b)(1) to enjoin an 
unauthorized corporate act, the court may enjoin or set aside the act, if equitable 
and if all affected persons are parties to the proceeding, and may award damages 
for loss (other than anticipated profits) suffered by the corporation or another party 
because of enjoining the unauthorized act. 
Id. 
141 See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 129 (8th ed. 2001) (stating that § 3.04 “almost (but not quite) abolish[es] 
the doctrine”). 
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for which a corporation may be organized” under California law.142  
Nike, Inc. states in its charter that its purpose is “to engage in any 
lawful activity for which corporations may be organized” under 
Oregon law.143  General Electric’s charter states that the corporation’s 
purposes include “any activity which may promote the interests of the 
corporation, or enhance the value of its property, to the fullest extent 
permitted by law, and in furtherance of the foregoing purposes to 
exercise all powers now or hereafter granted or permitted by law.”144  
The foregoing examples of the promise to engage only in lawful 
behavior in statutes and charters do not have teeth if courts do not 
enforce them.  Part II.C of this Article turns to court opinions to 
demonstrate that these requirements of statutes and promises in 
charters are enforced. 
C.  Recent Precedent: The Ultra Vires Cause of Action Is Not Just 
Alive but Kicking 
Since the heyday of the ultra vires doctrine, as exemplified in Bank 
of Augusta v. Earle,145 there have been no cases holding that ultra 
vires provisions in state incorporation laws are somehow invalid or 
unenforceable.  On the contrary, a key contribution of this Article to 
the existing literature is to point out that court opinions across the 
United States continue to consistently affirm the existence and vitality 
of the ultra vires statutes. 
Shareholders used an ultra vires cause of action in the 1986 case of 
Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries, Inc. to prevent a company 
from adopting a poison pill provision.146  The poison pill provision 
resulted in some shareholders being treated differently than other 
holders of the same class of shares.147  New Jersey law prohibited 
discriminatory treatment of individuals within the same class of 
 
142 Union Oil Co. of California, Restated Articles of Incorporation, art. II (Mar. 31, 
1998), available at http://sec.edgar-online.com/unocal-corp/10-ky05-annual-report             
-regulation-s-k-item-405/1998/03/31/Section60.aspx. 
143 Nike, Inc., Restated Articles of Incorporation, art. III (Aug. 31, 1995), available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/d9xWk.au.d.htm#1stPage. 
144 General Electric Co., Certificate of Incorporation, § 2D (Apr. 27, 2007), available at 
http://sec.edgar-online.com/general-electric-co/8-k-current-report-filing/2007/04/27/Sec 
tion7.aspx. 
145 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 587 (1839). 
146 Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1229–30 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986). 
147 Id. at 1233. 
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shareholders.148  Shareholders therefore argued that the adoption of 
the poison pill provision was ultra vires.149  The U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York accepted this logic and granted 
the requested injunction.150  This case indicates that the ultra vires 
doctrine is alive and functioning.151 
In similar cases, courts in other jurisdictions have decided that, as a 
matter of their state law, poison pill provisions are not illegal.152  
However, the opinions in these cases do not deny the existence of the 
ultra vires doctrine, they do not extensively question the standing of 
shareholders to bring such actions, nor do the courts state that it is 
outside of their ability to restrain corporations from engaging in 
activities that are illegal.153  Popular belief notwithstanding, courts 
continued to acknowledge the limits of corporate powers through the 
1900s.154 
 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1230. 
150 Id. at 1234. 
151 David A. Kulwicki, Amalgamated Sugar: The Auspicious Return of the Ultra Vires 
Doctrine, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 841 (1988).  Subsequently, after the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals denied a stay of the injunction, the federal district court made the injunction 
permanent, characterizing its original opinion to have been a final disposition on the issue 
of whether the poison pill provision was ultra vires.  Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL 
Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 87, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  Judge Vincent Broderick added that “I 
have rarely, in 10 years on the bench, seen a matter as vigorously and effectively contested 
as that of the validity of the preferred share purchase rights plan.”  Id. at 92.  Judge 
Broderick reiterated that the holding in his original decision was that the poison pill 
provision in question was: “‘[a]n unlawful device,’ and was ‘Ultra vires as a matter of 
New Jersey business corporation law.’”  Id. at 89 (quoting Amalgamated Sugar Co., 644 F. 
Supp. at 1240). 
152 See, e.g., Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 728 F. Supp. 807 (D. Me. 
1990). 
153 Id. at 808–09. 
154 See, e.g., Trico Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Corp. Comm’n, 339 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1959).  
The Arizona Supreme Court decided that the inclusion of the word “primarily” into the 
clause empowering the defendant corporation’s charter did nothing to expand its range of 
legitimate activities, holding that “[a]ny attempt to go beyond the service of electric 
energy to [the defendant corporation’s] members would be ultra vires and void.”  Id. at 
1053.  A year earlier, the Arizona Supreme Court similarly held that a corporation could 
not lawfully contract outside the object of its creation as defined in the law of its 
organization. 
  A corporation has only such powers as are expressly or impliedly conferred by 
its charter. Unlike a natural person, if [sic] may not do all things not expressly or 
impliedly prohibited, but must draw from its charter the power to act in any given 
respect, and can do only that which is expressly or impliedly authorized therein. 
Trico Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Ralston, 196 P.2d 470, 475 (Ariz. 1958). 
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A review of case law from 1997 to 2008 yields more specific 
examples of courts recognizing the standing of a shareholder to sue to 
enjoin an illegal act of a company by means of ultra vires statutes.  In 
2000, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine expressly stated that the 
Maine ultra vires statute allows the injunction of ongoing illegalities 
and the dissolution of corporations.155  Also in 2000, the Court of 
Civil Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed that  
the lack of capacity or power of a corporation to act may be asserted 
(1) by a shareholder in an action to enjoin the corporation from 
performing acts or transferring property, (2) by the corporation in 
an action against an officer or director for loss or damage due to 
unauthorized acts, and (3) by the Attorney General in an action to 
dissolve the corporation or enjoin it from transacting unauthorized 
business.156 
In 2006, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed Delaware law, 
Delaware Chancery Court decisions, and secondary sources, 
concluding that it had the power to enjoin ultra vires acts.157  Another 
affirmation that some acts—including illegal acts—are ultra vires and 
may be subject to an injunction is found in Multimedia Patent Trust v. 
Microsoft Corp., decided by the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California using Delaware law in 2007.158  In 2008, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California similarly 
affirmed that it had the power, based on well-settled precedent, to 
declare a decision of the board of directors of Hewlett Packard to be 
ultra vires, or outside of the board’s power to have authorized.159  
While the court did not have to act upon that power, the court did go 
out of its way to assert that it could enjoin ultra vires acts and 
 
155 Tomhegan Camp Owners Ass’n v. Murphy, 754 A.2d 334, 335–36 (Me. 2000) 
(citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-B, § 203 (2005 & Supp. 2007)).  The court rejected 
the argument that a nonprofit corporation lacked standing to sue where the dispute 
concerned unauthorized transactions. 
156 Total Access, Inc. v. Caddo Elec. Coop., 9 P.3d 95, 96–97 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) 
(finding that a third party Internet service provider could not sue a cooperative for acting 
outside of its corporate charter and providing competing services). 
157 Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 1186 n.70 (Nev. 2006). 
158 Multimedia Patent Trust v. Microsoft Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1216 (S.D. Cal. 
2007) (citing Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1114 n.45 (Del. Ch. 1999)). 
159 Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund v. Dunn, No. C-06-01711, 2008 WL 
878424, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008). 
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provided support for this conclusion with a review of Delaware law, 
to which this Article now turns.160 
The Delaware Chancery Court’s 1999 opinion in Harbor Finance 
Partners v. Huizenga is particularly important because of the number 
of major corporations incorporated under Delaware law,161 and the 
fact that the court clarified the business judgment rule vis-à-vis 
Delaware’s ultra vires statute.  The chancery court plainly stated that 
the business judgment rule does not protect board actions deemed 
ultra vires and that ultra vires acts cannot lawfully be accomplished in 
any case.162  Also in 1999, the Delaware Chancery Court observed 
that “[i]n the context of defining void acts, ultra vires acts . . . 
include[] acts specifically prohibited by the corporation’s charter, for 
which no implicit authority may be rationally surmised, or those acts 
contrary to basic principles of fiduciary law.”163 
In a 2002 decision, the Delaware Chancery Court concluded that a 
board’s repricing of options without shareholder approval was ultra 
vires because the stock option plan provided that any change in 
exercise price of options required shareholder approval.164  In a 2005 
decision, the Delaware Chancery Court held that ultra vires acts are 
“illegal acts or acts beyond the authority of the corporation.”165 
Related events outside the context of litigation also substantiate the 
notion that corporations have not acquired the freedom to violate 
laws.  In 1999, public interest groups and individuals petitioned the 
California Attorney General to revoke the charter of Unocal for a long 
history and continued pattern of illegal conduct, including violations 
 
160 The court found that the compensation received by Hewlett Packard CEO Carleton 
Fiorina was not ultra vires in that it was not outside the authority of the board to exercise 
discretion in deciding upon it.  Id. 
161 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 590 (2003).  
Delaware earns more corporate tax revenue than any other state and most large U.S. 
companies are incorporated in Delaware.  Id.  In part, Delaware’s dominance in corporate 
law stems from its small size, which gives corporate interest groups greater influence, as 
well as its specialized judiciary.  Id. at 594. 
162 Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 896 (Del. Ch. 1999).  This opinion 
also clarified a minor point of ambiguity in the law derived from the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s earlier opinion in Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 218–19 (Del. 1979), which 
could be interpreted as distinguishing between voidable acts—acts that could be ratified by 
subsequent shareholder approval—and ultra vires acts. 
163 Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1114 n.45. 
164 Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. 19191, 2002 WL 31888343, at *11 
(Del. Ch. 2002). 
165 Nevins v. Bryan, 885 A.2d 233, 245 (Del. Ch. 2005) (quoting Harbor Fin. Partners, 
751 A.2d at 896). 
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of international legal norms in its involvement with oil extraction in 
Burma and the attendant use of forced labor.166  While Attorney 
General Bill Lockyer declined the request, he did affirm the power of 
the attorney general to revoke corporate charters.167  This is obviously 
not precisely the same variety of action as a shareholder attempting to 
enjoin a corporation from an act.  However, it is persuasive evidence 
that state governments and courts retain the power to restrain 
corporations from engaging in unlawful activities.168 
III 
THE ULTRA VIRES DOCTRINE AS AN END-RUN AROUND THE 
SCALIA STANDING GAUNTLET 
A.  How the Ultra Vires Doctrine Would Function and Its Benefits 
Purchasing a share of a corporation is essentially purchasing a 
ticket to have standing in cases where the potential plaintiff might 
otherwise have problems proving standing against a corporation 
violating an environmental law.  An ultra vires suit would allege a 
violation of an environmental law as the illegality that the plaintiffs 
would be asking the court to enjoin.  This end-run around the Scalia 
standing gauntlet has not been previously discussed in scholarly 
literature.169  This cause of action would be a sufficient basis to 
request an injunction to cease ongoing illegalities, to ask that an 
appropriate fine be paid, and to ask for the equitable relief of court 
monitoring to assure that the defendant company complies with the 
court’s rulings.170 
 
166 Press Release, Nat’l Lawyers Guild, Coalition Petitions the New California 
Governor and Attorney General to Revoke Unocal’s Corporate Charter (Apr. 15, 1999), 
available at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/archives/199904/msg00212.html. 
167 Id. 
168 For a discussion of charter revocation as a tool for encouraging compliance with 
environmental laws, see Mitchell F. Crusto, Green Business: Should We Revoke Corporate 
Charters for Environmental Violations?, 63 LA. L. REV. 175 (2003) and Thomas Linzey, 
Killing Goliath: Defending Our Sovereignty and Environmental Sustainability Through 
Corporate Charter Revocation in Pennsylvania and Delaware, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 31 (1997). 
169 One author came close to making this connection when considering the question of 
whether corporations guilty of breaking environmental laws should be dissolved.  The 
author, however, did not consider using an ultra vires lawsuit to enjoin the corporation.  
See Crusto, supra note 168. 
170 See Greenfield, supra note 117, at 1351–60. 
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In precedent cases, where a shareholder has sued to enjoin an 
illegality of a corporation, courts have also agreed to make officers 
and directors personally liable.  In Roth v. Robertson, the New York 
Supreme Court held corporate directors of an amusement park 
personally liable for bribing public officials to not enforce laws 
prohibiting the operation of their business on Sundays.171  The court 
stated that corporate directors would be required to refund the 
damages to the corporation—the amount of fines that were levied—
arising from the illegality, even if the shareholder plaintiff had 
acquiesced in the act, and even if the act could be shown to be in the 
shareholders’ interest.172  Moreover, the damages were not adjusted to 
take into account that the violation of law had been a profitable 
decision.173  Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly found that 
executives can be held personally liable for ultra vires acts.174  
Therefore, there is precedent to suggest that a shareholder could ask 
that the appropriate fines be assessed and that the executives or 
directors who authorized the illegal acts pay them. 
Even staunch critics of ultra vires statutes admit that officers and 
directors can be made to pay fines for ultra vires acts.  First, the 
attorney general may seek judicial dissolution of a corporation that 
engages in ultra vires acts.  Secondly, shareholders may seek an 
injunction to restrain the corporation in which they own shares from 
engaging in an ultra vires act or acts.  In addition, quite sensibly, 
liability of a corporation’s directors, officers, or other agents 
responsible for an ultra vires act or acts is statutorily retained.  The 
corporation is statutorily empowered to seek recovery from them by 
suing them for involving it in the ultra vires business activity in the 
first place.  The American solution therefore empowers those whose 
financial motivation would tend to promote vigilance.  They are 
motivated to act as guardians of the corporation and its assets.  These 
 
171 Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909). 
172 Id. at 353. 
173 Id. 
174 See, e.g., Lurie v. Ariz. Fertilizer & Chem. Co., 421 P.2d 330 (Ariz. 1966); Mid-
Am. Elevator Co. v. Norcon, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (officers and 
directors can be held personally liable for activities continued after the dissolution of the 
corporate form); Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co., 87 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1952) (making 
officers pay back money to the company given ultra vires to the wife of a deceased 
executive). 
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sentinels can and do protect the corporation from the negative 
consequences of ultra vires activities.175 
Using an ultra vires cause of action would therefore result in six 
benefits.  First, the plaintiffs’ standing would be secure, given their 
status as shareholders.  Second, the court could grant the plaintiffs’ 
request for declaratory relief, clarifying that an illegality had in fact 
occurred, despite an agency’s failure, for whatever reason, to fulfill its 
mandate.  Third, the court could directly enjoin the corporation from 
the relevant illegal activity.  An ultra vires lawsuit is more useful than 
existing tools because, unlike a shareholder derivative suit, even if a 
violation of a law is profitable it can still be enjoined.  Fourth, if ultra 
vires acts had ceased by the time of the final judgment, the court 
could direct the corporation to pay the appropriate fine.  Fifth, a court 
could use its powers in equity to order court monitoring of the 
defendant corporation to assure that the illegalities do not recur.  
Finally, as explained above, there is historical precedent for company 
managers paying the fines owed by a corporation for illegal acts that 
they had ordered; the fact that the illegal acts were profitable to the 
company would make no difference in the amount of fine that 
managers had to pay. 
B.  Rebuttals to Foreseeable Objections and Why Ultra Vires 
Statutes Do—and Should—Guarantee Standing 
1.  The Statutory Grant of Standing for Shareholders Is Unqualified 
One foreseeable objection to the thesis of this Article—that 
plaintiffs seeking to enforce environmental laws can assure 
themselves standing by buying shares in their adversaries—is that the 
relevant statutes surely do not allow for such an application.  Yet, as 
reviewed above, the statutory language granting an ultra vires cause 
of action is so clear and utterly unqualified that it is safe to conclude 
that it is a grant of standing per se.  So long as there is an ongoing 
illegality, a shareholder plaintiff may sue to enjoin a company from 
continuing this conduct.  The language of the statutes does not leave 
much room for interpretation or confusion. 
2.  Precedent Cases Have Never Discriminated Among Shareholders 
 
175 Leacock, supra note 107, at 96–97; see also Robert S. Stevens, A Proposal as to the 
Codification and Restatement of the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 36 YALE L.J. 297, 307–08 
(1927). 
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Bringing Ultra Vires Lawsuits 
Turning to the reasoning in precedent cases for guidance, one sees 
a clear and consistent history of judges accepting the standing of ultra 
vires plaintiffs who seek to enjoin a corporation from activities not 
authorized in its corporate charter without question or discussion.  
This includes enjoining companies from illegalities.  This trend 
continues into recent decades, as described above.  Therefore, it 
would be a novel development to question the legitimacy of a 
shareholder bringing an ultra vires lawsuit to enforce an 
environmental law. 
3.  If the Cause of Action Is Restricted to Self-Interested 
Shareholders, Such Potential Plaintiffs Exist 
Another predictable critique is that an environmental plaintiff 
purchasing a single share or small volume of shares for the purpose of 
assuring standing may not be deemed to be the “right” kind of 
plaintiff with the “right” interest at stake.  Perhaps a judge could 
imagine that the ultra vires cause of action should be restricted to 
investors who are motivated by financial self-interest.  Even though, 
as indicated by the statutes and precedent cited above, the ultra vires 
statutory provisions grant standing to shareholders per se, it may 
present an even less ambiguous scenario to a skeptical judge if one of 
the named plaintiffs was a large institutional investor with a twofold 
mandate to (1) encourage social or environmental responsibility and 
(2) preserve the long-term value of its investments.  The New York 
City Employees’ Retirement System, Walden Asset Management, 
ISIS Asset Management, and Trillium Asset Management 
Corporation, for example, precisely fit this profile.  They have 
invested years of time and millions of dollars in actions to promote 
corporate responsibility and ought to consider the ultra vires doctrine 
as a more efficient device, in some cases, to fulfill their goals.176  
Therefore, even if a court reinterprets ultra vires causes of action to 
only be available to investors with some arbitrarily defined minimum 
financial interest at stake, such plaintiffs exist and are likely willing to 
invest money to stop corporate misconduct.  Communication and 
coordination with existing concerned investors is another approach 
that environmental plaintiffs should consider.  Because no money 
 
176 Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a Prod, and a Big Stick: An 
Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as 
Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 937–41 (2005). 
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damages are sought from the corporation and given the willingness of 
concerned investors to expend resources to expose corporate 
misbehavior, there is reason to believe that some existing investors 
would cooperate in bringing an ultra vires lawsuit to enjoin violations 
of environmental laws. 
4.  The Historical Concerns Motivating the Emergence of the Ultra 
Vires Cause of Action Are Still Valid 
The concerns that motivated the emergence of the ultra vires 
doctrine—the progenitor of the ultra vires cause of action in state 
statutes—should be recognized as still being valid.  If a shareholder 
alleges that ongoing illegalities threaten the value of shares, a court 
cannot, as a threshold question, presume in good faith and with 
absolute certainty that there will not be adverse effects on share value.  
On the contrary, in an era where private investors and institutional 
investors have deliberately allocated $2.71 trillion to ethically 
screened investment funds and even large investment banks have 
committed to better screening of investments for social or 
environmental performance,177 the burden of proof ought to be on the 
company managers to prove that a pattern of ongoing illegalities will 
not eventually result in lower share value. 
In other words, it seems more likely that ongoing illegalities, 
however profitable in the short term, will at some point result in 
negative repercussions, be they deteriorated shareholder trust and 
relationships; government fines; negative reputational impacts among 
consumers; or negative impacts on employee recruitment, motivation, 
and retention.178  The historical motivation for the doctrine and 
statutes has been to protect shareholders from a loss of value in their 
investments and courts must recognize this motivation to protect 
invested wealth is still a valid concern.  Obviously, as acknowledged 
 
177 Press Release, Soc. Invest. Forum, Report: Socially Responsible Investing Assets in 
U.S. Surged 18 Percent from 2005 to 2007, Outpacing Broader Managed Assets (Mar. 5, 
2008), http://www.socialinvest.org/news/releases/pressrelease.cfm?id=108.  From 2005 to 
2007, Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) assets grew more than eighteen percent 
while all investment assets under management edged up by less than three percent.  Id.  
There were $2.71 trillion in total assets under management in 2007 using one or more of 
three SRI strategies—screening, shareholder advocacy, and community investing—up 
from $2.29 trillion in 2005.  Id.  In 2008, nearly one out of every nine dollars under 
professional management in the United States was involved in SRI.  Id. 
178 See KPMG, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 
2008 (2008), http://www.kpmg.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/International-corporate       
-responsibility-survey-2008_v2.pdf. 
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above, a large institutional investor with both a significant financial 
interest and a mandate to invest in socially and environmentally 
responsible businesses would be a plaintiff best positioned to make 
these arguments. 
5.  The Intent of State Legislatures Should Be Respected 
Why, despite the elimination of all other prerequisite promises for 
incorporation, have the legislatures of forty-six states decided to 
retain language in their incorporation statutes that requires a 
corporation to promise to behave lawfully?  More significantly, why 
would the mechanism that allows shareholders and state attorneys 
general to enjoin or dissolve corporations be retained in corporation 
laws of forty-nine states?  Authors who ask this question conclude 
that this many legislatures did not happen to leave these provisions in 
their state incorporation laws by accident.  The intent of legislatures 
must have been to provide a clear minimum standard for corporate 
actions and a means to enforce such a minimum standard.179 
6.  The U.S. Constitution Requires that Ultra Vires Lawsuits Be 
Available to All Shareholder Plaintiffs 
The U.S. Constitution requires that a plaintiff desiring to enforce 
environmental laws through an ultra vires cause of action be 
recognized as having standing.  It would be highly discriminatory—a 
clear denial of due process and equal protection—for any court to 
recognize the standing of investors alleging possibly illegal poison 
pill provisions but to then fail to recognize the standing of investors 
alleging violations of environmental law.180  As discussed above, 
investors using the ultra vires cause of action have been consistently 
granted standing by the U.S. Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, 
and state courts.  Therefore, to carve out a category of investors and 
exempt them from having standing because of the nature of the 
illegalities that they allege would be an exercise in unconstitutional 
discrimination. 
 
179 See Greenfield, supra note 117. 
180 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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7. The Lack of Money Damages Means Frivolous Litigation Is 
Unlikely 
A foreseeable critique is that allowing an “end-run” around 
standing jurisprudence would flood the courts with plaintiffs chasing 
every minor possibility of an illegality, thereby burdening both 
corporations and courts.  This objection is easily overcome.  First, the 
ultra vires cause of action exists, and based on the foregoing summary 
of recent court decisions across the country, there is no evidence that 
the ultra vires cause of action has been used frivolously.  Second, the 
fact that injunctive relief and not monetary damages are the goal of 
environmental enforcement litigation helps explain why there has 
been a dearth of frivolous suits.181  Similarly, because the primary 
goal of an ultra vires lawsuit is to enjoin a corporation, there likewise 
is very little reason to believe that this cause of action will suddenly 
trigger an avalanche of frivolous litigation.  Environmental advocates 
are highly unlikely to risk millions of dollars litigating over trivial 
violations of the law when no money damages are at stake and when 
the facts are anything less than certain and compelling. 
8.  Ultra Vires Lawsuits Overcome a Critical Limitation of 
Shareholder Derivative Suits 
It is a cliché of business and society, business law, or ethics 
courses in business schools to point out that executives do 
occasionally look at a cost-benefit analysis to determine if following 
the law makes sense.182  Some scholars support this theoretical 
framing of law-as-price, placing the duty to maximize price ahead of 
the duty to obey the law.183  If this is the case and if the profits to be 
gained from a violation of law exceed the cost of the fine or other 
liabilities, then a manager would have a duty to break the law.  Some 
argue this is consistent with their fiduciary duty and adequate to 
immunize them from shareholder derivate suits, so long as breaking 
the law presents the company with a net financial gain.184  The basis 
for this theoretical approach—placing the duty to maximize 
 
181 See Dunne, supra note 94, at 43–45. 
182 See, e.g., TONY MCADAMS ET AL., LAW, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 40 (9th ed. 2009). 
183 See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1537–52 (1984) 
(describing the difference between viewing law as sanction versus viewing law as price). 
184 See, e.g., Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the 
General Law Compliance Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the American Law Institute’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413 (1991). 
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shareholder value ahead of the duty to obey the law—contradicts the 
plain language of state incorporation statutes.  The ultra vires 
provisions in state incorporation laws can correct for this shortcoming 
of derivative suits and allow the injunction of illegalities, even if they 
are profitable in the short term.185 
9.  Other Arguments Grounded in Policy, Ethical Reasoning, and 
Respect for State Legislatures 
Other scholarly works and secondary sources concur that courts 
have the power to enjoin ultra vires activities and that this is desirable 
from a public policy perspective.186  These works have already 
presented theoretical foundations for the conclusion that ultra vires 
statutes have real meaning and ought to continue to play a role as a 
tool to protect the interests of both investors and the public.  A brief 
synopsis of these arguments is, however, appropriate. 
From a contractarian perspective—that is, if we consider a 
corporation to be a nexus of contracts—the parties to a contract would 
all logically want the existing ultra vires provisions to persist.187  The 
entity granting the corporation its existence—a state government—
would want to have the means to assure that the corporation obeys 
laws, and in cases of continued abuse, the means to revoke its charter.  
Those contracting to be owners of the corporation—the 
shareholders—surely should similarly have the means to restrain their 
entity when it deviates from the law in violation of the promise of the 
charter. 
There is one more argument why ultra vires lawsuits should assure 
the standing of plaintiffs; this one grounded in ethical reasoning.  One 
can apply Rawls’ theory of justice; that is, without knowing ahead of 
time who we would be or where we would be positioned in terms of 
power and privilege, one can imagine what kind of rules we would 
logically want to live under.188  Surely no one—without knowing 
ahead of time who they would be in a society or ex ante—would want 
 
185 See Greenfield, supra note 117, at 1298–99. 
186 7A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3400, at 10–12 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1997); Kulwicki, supra 
note 151, at 851. 
187 This perspective is described in greater detail by Kent Greenfield.  Greenfield, supra 
note 117, at 1291–93. 
188 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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other people or entities to be empowered to break laws.189  There are 
other factors to add to the abstract scenario, such as constraints on 
resources for law enforcement, lobbying pressure on political 
institutions, the superior economic resources of corporations, and the 
impediments to citizen enforcement suits.  It then becomes readily 
apparent that good public policy practically begs for a vigorous means 
for, at the very least, shareholders to rein in corporations when they 
are otherwise tempted in the short term to violate the law, irrespective 
of long-term consequences for all stakeholders.190  Illegalities of all 
sorts are commonly acknowledged and ongoing, yet they are not 
remedied or corrected by any government authority.191  This fact adds 
weight to the argument that courts should recognize this clearly 
available mechanism for citizen law enforcement efforts through 
corporate law statutes. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
This Article highlights a tool that citizen plaintiffs in 
environmental litigation may use to establish and retain standing.  In 
doing so, this Article contributes to recent scholarly literature of ultra 
vires lawsuits by tracing their historical origins in greater detail, by 
 
189 Greenfield, supra note 117, at 1323–42. 
190 Stephen Fotis documents the historical decline in political will and resources to 
enforce environmental laws in his comment in the American University Law Review.  
Fotis, supra note 92, at 149–50.  In 1982 and 1983, the EPA’s budget was reduced by one-
third and enforcement attorneys were cut eighty-five percent from two hundred to thirty; 
“crippling” organizational changes and attitudes of appointees further limited the EPA’s 
enforcement activities.  Id. at 130–31 n.15.  The number of civil cases that the EPA has 
referred to the Department of Justice decreased from 242 in 1979 to 110 in 1982, and 
administrative actions by the EPA against polluters dropped from 2139 to 1129.  Id. at 130 
n.14. 
191 SEC disclosure laws, for example, are among those that are openly and widely 
disregarded.  A 1992 Price Waterhouse survey found that the financial statements of sixty-
two percent of respondents failed to follow SEC rules and did not disclose fines for 
environmental illegalities in excess of $100,000.  PRICE WATERHOUSE, ACCOUNTING FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE: CROSSROADS OF GAAP, ENGINEERING AND 
GOVERNMENT 10–11 (1992).  A 1996 academic study found a fifty-four percent 
nonreporting rate for known CERCLA potentially responsible parties (PRPs) in initial 
public offering registration statements and a sixty-one percent nonreporting rate among 
currently registered companies also known to be CERCLA PRPs.  David W. Case, 
Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics 
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 410 (2005).  A governmental study found that 
seventy-four percent of corporations in its sample fail to comply with disclosure 
requirements.  Id. at 410 n.188. 
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clarifying terminology, by reviewing recent court opinions, and by 
explicitly stating that ultra vires statutes are grounds for shareholders 
to sue to enforce statutes. 
While not central to the thesis of this Article, it is appropriate to 
highlight briefly why citizen enforcement of environmental statutes is 
an important issue in the bigger scheme of things.  Unchecked 
anthropogenic environmental degradation is literally a matter of life 
and death for, conservatively stated, hundreds of thousands of species 
and potentially tens of millions of humans at risk of becoming 
environmental refugees or worse, casualties.192  Whether it is 
exacerbated drought in developing nations or cancer rates in the 
developed world, all of humanity is in a crisis precipitated by a 
combination of industrialization, growth in demand for goods and 
services, and lack of restraint or adjustment of damaging activities 
stemming from a lack of awareness and will.193  Given that citizen 
enforcement suits supplement governmental enforcement of relevant 
statutes and regulations, the facilitation of citizen enforcement efforts 
is a topic worthy of attention.  Citizen enforcement suits are clearly 
not a “silver bullet” solution to all environmental problems, but they 
 
192 A consensus indicator statistic on the state of the world’s natural environment is that 
a distinct species is lost every ten minutes.  This sixth mass extinction of life in the history 
of the planet—explainable largely by massive habitat destruction by humans—is without 
precedent in the last sixty-five million years.  TERRY GLAVIN, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: 
JOURNEYS AMONG THE LOST AND LEFT BEHIND 1 (2006); see also PAUL R. EHRLICH & 
ANNE H. EHRLICH, EXTINCTION (1981); RICHARD LEAKEY & ROGER LEWIN, THE SIXTH 
EXTINCTION: PATTERNS OF LIFE AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANKIND (1996); DUGALD 
STERMER, VANISHING FLORA (1995); DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA OF BIODIVERSITY 
(1996); EDWARD O. WILSON, THE CREATION: AN APPEAL TO SAVE LIFE ON EARTH 
(2006); EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE (2002).  The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC)—which, because of its consensus-building process, may have 
arrived at conservative forecasts—projects that climate changes will drastically exacerbate 
storm severity, clean water shortages, food scarcity, and the very viability of coastal cities 
that are homes to hundreds of millions of people.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, U.N., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 52–54 (2007).  
Rising sea level, an observable effect of global climate change, has already permanently 
displaced five hundred thousand people in Bangladesh, which is among the low-lying 
countries that are beginning to feel these impacts.  Emily Wax, In Flood-Prone 
Bangladesh, a Future that Floats, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2007, at A01. 
193 For example, by 2015, the number of people in water-stressed countries (having less 
than 1700 cubic meters of water per capita per year) will increase to three billion; this 
trend is attributable to extremely water-intensive agricultural practices.  CIA, GLOBAL 
TRENDS 2015, at 27 (2000).  Exacerbated human health problems are anticipated, both 
locally and globally, as a result of both past and present industrial activity in the developed 
economies of the world as well as the ongoing industrialization and urbanization of the 
developing world.  Id. at 31. 
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are an important piece of the puzzle.  The observable, worldwide 
scope of environmental problems shows recently revised and stricter 
standing tests to be somewhat silly academic exercises that are 
dangerously out of touch with the realities of an urgent global 
crisis.194 
On a less global scale, the ambiguity and inconsistency in recent 
decisions on standing has led to inefficiencies and inconsistencies in 
the application of these rules among federal district and appellate 
courts and arguably between various decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
As explained above, ultra vires statutes, which are still functioning 
in other contexts, provide an elegant end-run around the maddening 
exercise of showing that a citizen plaintiff is sufficiently harmed by a 
violation of a law.  Ultra vires statutes may be used by shareholders to 
either dissolve a corporation or to enjoin ongoing or planned 
illegalities.  Precedent cases indicate that it also may be possible to 
force a corporation, or even executives and directors, to pay relevant 
fines as a cost of law breaking. 
From a certain idealistic perspective, ultra vires statutes may seem 
somewhat unfair as they currently function in this context, inasmuch 
as they place shareholders in a category superior to other citizens vis-
à-vis violators of the law.  That is, shareholders—or those with the 
resources to purchase shares—are in the privileged position of having 
access to the courts to assert a right that Congress intentionally gave 
to all citizens in landmark pieces of legislation.  In an ideal world, the 
cases establishing the strict yet unpredictably applied Scalia standing 
gauntlet should be overturned if congressional intent and statutory 
text are to be respected by the judiciary. 
Regardless of such a potential critique from those who strongly 
believe that standing tests should be relaxed or eliminated, until such 
changes come about, environmental plaintiffs have a means to 
 
194 The exercise of proving standing in court is silly enough without pointing to its 
being exclusively anthropocentric.  The concept of other life forms or even mountains or 
rivers or ecosystems having standing, as mentioned above in Part I.C, has been suggested 
before.  See Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 
397, 461–62 (1996); Manus, supra note 8; Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have 
Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).  Also 
as mentioned above in Part I.C, Justice William Douglas’s dissent in Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742–49 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), explicitly suggested that 
inanimate objects such as trees and rivers be granted standing, noting that standing is 
granted to completely fictional persons in the case of business corporations. 
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circumvent a subjective and confusing set of standing tests that only 
create inefficiencies and uncertainties for the courts and all the parties 
involved in litigation. 
The practical application of the foregoing analysis is as follows.  
Plaintiffs seeking to enforce environmental laws against a corporation 
are well advised to buy shares in their adversaries.  In other words, 
plaintiffs may acquire and defend their standing in court by buying 
shares in the very corporations that they may be seeking to enjoin.  
The purchase of a share, besides being the practical equivalent of 
purchasing a ticket to assure standing, allows plaintiffs to seek 
injunctions against corporations and other equitable remedies such as 
court monitoring.  Forcing the payment of fines by the corporation or 
its officers and directors is also supported by precedent cases.  
Legislative intent, clear statutory language, the historical motivations 
for the relevant doctrine and statutes, consistently and universally 
applied precedent, good public policy, the protection of investors’ 
interests, logic, and even an appeal to the constitutional rights to equal 
protection and due process all dictate this result. 
 
 
